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THE VALUE OF LAW TO HISTORIANS
CHARLES F. MULLE T *
The contents of a law review ought to be examined with scarcely less
attention by historians than by lawyers. Although at first glance it appears
that such a review is designed only for technical specialists, historians who
have in any way penetrated below the surface of past events are keenly
aware of the relations between law and history. Discrepancies so far as
method is concerned undoubtedly exist between the two but the importance
of legal materials is such that the historian whatever his field of interest,
whether country, period, or tendency, cannot possibly neglect them. Indeed
he must rigorously and arduously study them since no other materials
throw into variegated relief every aspect of past or of present civilization.
Mr. Justice Holmes put the case for law as an historical source with intoxi-
cating effect when he imaged
"... a princess mightier than she who once wrought at Bayeaux, ex-
ternallyweaving into her web dim figures of the everlengthening past
-figures too dim to be noticed by the idle, too symbolic to be inter-
preted except by pupils, but to the discerning eye disclosing every
painful step and every world-shaking contest by which mankind
has worked and fought its way from savage isolation to organic
social life.1"
What is true for the historian applies only slightly less to the political
scientist, the economist, and the sociologist. To take a specific but com-
prehensive example: if there has appeared a more significant appraisal
of modern political, economic, and social trends, within similar compass,
than The Modern Corporation and Private Property, by Berle and Means,
the writer is unfamiliar with it; and what is today an acute essay in political
economy will tomorrow become a most valued source of social and eco-
nomic, not to say legal, history.2 Hence it can be seen that when legal
*Professor of History, University of Missouri. A.B., 1922, Syracuse Univer-
sity; A.M., 1923, Clark University; Ph.D., 1933, Columbia University. Contributor
to the VA. L. REV., FORDHAM L. REV., and Mo. L. REV., and author of FUNDA-
MENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1933).
1. HOLMES, SPEECHES (1900) 18.
2. In a somewhat different but extraordinarily revealing vein, see BORKIN
and WELSH, GERMANYS MASTER PLAN (1943) and Hamilton, The Strange Case of
Sterling Products (Jan., 1943) 186 HARPERS. These accounts of a country's "indus-
trial offensive," based as they are to a large extent on legal materials and certainly
informed by legal insight, uncover a large area of international relations hitherto
unmapped if not entirely unknown.
(144)
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"data provide the foundation for such a study they are not be regarded
as of interest only to lawyers. Blackstone long ago observed that those
who are charged with public leadership in any scene of life cannot properly
discharge "their duty either to the public or to themselves, without some
degree of knowledge in the laws."
Not so many years ago historians often related the history of a given
country or period largely in terms of public law or, more specifically, legis-
lation. Several notable works of that character were produced and no one
seemed to notice any essential incongruity in neglecting judicial decisions.
While there is no intention here to disparage or to condemn those efforts,
historians themselves soon began to find such treatments inadequate. Yet
at the same time it is clear that works like Spencer Walpole's History of
England and James Schouler's History of the United States possessed signal
merit and, even in some cases, brilliance. Those volumes often contained a
wide variety of interesting information and a proper balance between men
and imponderaBles, and perhaps because of the limited nature of their sources
were marked by unusually effective exposition. Moreover, as anyone knows
who has but read the table of contents of .the Parliamentary Debates care-
fully, it is possible to gain a comprehensive, if not always profound, insight
into the past (and the present as well) through such materials.
Nevertheless, as historians began to use other materials-private papers,
economic reports, pamphlets, newspapers, and literature-they reacted
against exclusive dependence on legal sources, whether legislative or juridi-
cal. They tended to feel that other documents gave much the same infor-
mation in a more illuminating fashion, that legal records were often super-
ficial or incomplete, that the inadequacy of the older historians was due
in part to the nature of their sources, and that legal data compelled a kind
of party allegiance which no longer seemed valid. Historians who had chiefly
depended on legislative records of one sort or another came to be pointed
out for their deficiencies, and such contributions as they had made were
ignored as untrustworthy or oversimplified. Perhaps this reaction was both
justified and healthy in so far as it touched many of the works already
produced; for at least some writers had not only neglected valuable mate-
rials, but also because of that neglect, had failed to exhaust the materials
they did use. On the other hand, this reaction had the unfortunate effect
of pouring scorn on the sources upon which these works depended. Legal
records of whatsoever kind were disregarded, and historians, whether eco-
19441
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nomic, social, institutional, or cultural, freely neglected data most fruitful
in reconstructing the past.
Yet many historians with quite diverse interests have found in law a
most important source, a source revehling, in the words of Santayana, that
a "man's life as it flows is not a theorem to which there is any one rigid
solution" but "is composed of many strands and looks to divers issues." Par-
ticularly, legal materials have contributed to an understanding of ideas,
institutions, and policies, and they have accented the realization that social
evolution in becoming more heterogeneous has not necessarily become more
complex. In the past, concepts were not so individuated and as a result a
notion was likely to be a pot-pourri of prejudice-legal, social, and religious.
With all its value, however, no one will deny that the use of law as an
historical source raises many difficulties.
Today the layman and the lawyer alike often incline to view law as
a highly specialized branch of knowledge, so highly specialized in fact that
it is regarded as an esoteric methodology of which only the initiates have a
right to speak. In fact even a religious element has penetrated, and a dis-
tinguished psychologist, interested and informed concerning the relation
and the potential contribution of psychology to law, has observed that "the
lawyers are a priesthood with a prestige to maintain."'3 Such a situation
contrasts strikingly with the English law of not so long ago where individu-
ated concepts were not to be discerned. As a consequence of the modern
idea the primary purpose of the law schools seems to be to "train students
in mastery of method, leaving, of course the mastery of the law itself, as
its nature requires, to later professional occupation."'4 While the writer is
by no means suggesting that the technical details of law do not demand the
most specialized discipline, the attitude of some lawyers illustrates very
well George Bernard Shaw's quip that every profession is a conspiracy against
the laity. After all, the historian must take his materials where he finds
them; and if his path leads to cases and to legislation a mandamus should
not issue against his use of them.
If there were any need, and I certainly do not intend to insist upon
this point, no profession has exceeded the poaching activity of the lawyers.
Questions involving a highly skilled knowledge of economics, social psy-
3. E. S.' ROBINSoN, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935) 28.
4. E. J. URCH, The Effects of Methods of Learning Law Upon Appreciation
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chology, politics, and history have been settled by lawyers with more or
less competence; and that is why historians cannot neglect the law: it is
so comprehensive. By virtue of this fact then, the lawyers can scarcely
resent the use of legal materials by historians. Perhaps all historians should
be required to take Contracts, Real Property, or Wills, but in absence of
that training they must do the best they can and bear the burden of their
technical shortcomings; for, even more than philosophy in these days, his-
tory puts in order the multiple factors of human experience, especially with
reference to the past.
The growing realization of the worth of legal materials to the historian
appears in a variety of ways. Schools of law following the lead of eminent
jurists make definite efforts to relate themselves to the social studies, and
social scientists begin to take increased cognizance of law. It is scarcely
necessary here to recall that such legists as Gierke, Maitland, Vinogradoff,
Duguit, Pound, Holmes, and Cardozo have revealed the "social nature of
legal origins and transformations, indicating how law adjusts itself to chang-
ing social conditions at large." 5 In essays, lectures, and decisions these men
and others like them have shown that the law is not an end in itself but
is made up of the dictates of economic or social tendencies and "the law
governs the relations of men and women in an ordered society."6
Specifically in this connection one may emphasize how much of primi-
tive society-whether that of Anglo-Saxon England or the Melanesians-
has been reconstructed from tribal law. Perhaps at times too much, but
that has been the fault less of the material than of the man. Moreover, how
often when men have sought the reform of their country's institutions they
have unerringly hit upon the core-the law. If that could be changed, they
have seemed to say, or actually have said, other reforms would quickly
follow. The soundness of such a position immediately stands revealed when
we realize how many reform ideals-the diverse fields of labor organization,
religious toleration, and public health come readily to mind-have had
to wait for their concrete manifestation and effective application upon law.
A further example of the treatment of law as a social science comes to
5. H. E. BARNES (ed.), THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1925) 50. See also POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (1922),
LAW AND MORALS (1924), THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921), INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923), and Jurisprudence in THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES; CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922),
and THE GROWTH OF THE LAw (1924).
6. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922) 67; Hughes,
Address of Chief Justice Hughes (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 325, 326,
19441
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light in a recent Yearbook of the National Council of the Social Studies. 7
Under the title, "The Effects of Methods of Learning Law upon Apprecia-
tion of Justice," one writer has emphasized law as a subject with social
objectives. Primarily concerned with methods of teaching law, he com-
plains that too frequently the purpose of the law schools is to train people
to pass the bar examination whereas he would insist upon Cardozo's view
that a knowledge of social studies must be added to logic and precedents
(history!) to make good decisions. Similar testimony comes from W. P. M.
Kennedy. Law, he says, ".... must not be created in vacuo; and above all it
must not be taught in vacuo, apart from the other social sciences. The
training of lawyers apart from history, economics, sociology, political science,
and philosophy-as is too generally the custom-seems to me something
like throwing a medical student into clinical work before he has acquired a
competent familiarity with physics, chemistry, biology and physiology.",,
Opinions of this sort coming from recognized jurists and legal philosophers
have greatly modified both the curricula and the viewpoint of legal instruc-
tion; and law schools, small as well as large, have steadily insisted upon
the value of social science as a prerequisite to the richest professional train-
ing.
The purpose here, however, is not to repeat what men of the caliber
of Holmes, Cardozo, and Pound-to mention but the most conspicuous-have
said concerning the needs of the embryonic lawyer: they are men of authority
and withal effective scribes. My purpose rather is to call attention to the
converse of their theorem-the value of law to one group of social scientists,
the historians. Yet the two propositions impinge on one another and refer-
ence scarcely can be made to one without appreciation of the other. In-
asmuch as law is the "framework of the social machine" and the "instrument
of society," which must constantly be revised in order to function effectively,
there is all the more reason why historians should realize that a knowledge
of law needs to be added to other. materials to insure a well-rounded under-
standing of the past. Because law has been stable yet has not stood still
it provides the historian with an ideal point of departure and with untold
riches for his assessment of social development and human evolution.
Even the very definitions of law throw light on the processes of his-
torical evolution. Whether we take the summa ratio of Cicero and Coke,
7. URcH, supra, note 4.
8. KENNEDY, SOME AsPEcTs OF THE THEORIES AND WORKINGS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1932) 25.
[Vol. 9
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the thical, even spiritual, concepts of Thomas Aquinas and the Spanish
jurists of the sixteenth century, the notion of law as the epitome of the
Volkgeist and Volkgesckickte held by German legists of the earlier nine-
teenth century, or the supernatural imperative of some present-day spell-
binder, we have gained insight into the state of mind not only of the particu-
lar apostle, but also of the times. When such a critical legist as Karl Llewel-
lyn, wary of definition, characterizes law as "... . the area of contract, of inter-
action, between official regulatory behavior and the behavior of those affect-
ing official regulatory behavior or affected by it," he is reflecting an intel-
lectual change that embraces more than law.9 As law ceases to be viewed in
transcendental concepts and is considered in terms of its functional applica-
tion we may realize more than ever its value as an historical source. Without
losing its intellectual significance it has gained broader social implications.
Law as something to live by is no bed of Procrustes but, from the historian's
standpoint, the motivation and the reflection of social evolution.
A wide variety of evidence bears out these generalizations but before
surveying the implicit testimony mention may be made of some explicit
recognition of law's relation to social development. Not long ago W. A.
Robson published an informing "study of the relations between men's ideas
about the universe and the institutions of law and government," in which
he charted the origins of law and its connections with religion, reason, con-
duct, and opinions.10 Similarly Huntington Cairns has stressed the relations
of law to sociology, anthropology, economics, psychology, and political
theory, and in addition has successfully illustrated his own suggestion that
stagnation in method in the social sciences has been averted by the syn-
theses of varied data. 1 The anthropologists, Malinowski and Lowie, have
indicated the importance of law for the study of primitive societies and in
so doing have revealed the extent to which law may be used to discover the
lineaments of societies now long since passed away.'
2
9. Friedrich, Remarks on Llewellyn's View of Law, Official Behavior, Political
Science (1935) 50 POL. ScI. Q. 419.
10. CIVILIZATION AND THE GROWTH OF LAW (1935). For further evidence of
the same author's viewpoint, as expressed in his treatment of a concrete problem,
see his JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1928).
11. LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1935), and in V. F. CALVERTON (ed.),
THE MAKING OF MAN (1931).
12. B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926); Robert
Lowie, Incorporeal Property in Primitive Society (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 551-
63. The works of W. H. Rivers, Robert Briffault, and Alexander Goldenweiser, as
well as Lowie's more general studies, are likewise valuable.
19441
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Constitutional and legal history constantly reveals the broader impli-
cation of its own elements, and legal materials themselves signify far less
as ends than as means to understand the past. How, for example, can one
discuss comprehensively various aspects of legal history without referring
to the social structure illustrated by the materials on which he is comment-
ing? As no one can understand what Marx really meant without reference
to Marx's intellectual, social, and economic background, so no one can dis-
cuss either Coke or the rule in Shelly's Case intelligently or intelligibly with-
out attention to the times. True, efforts are often made without such atten-
tion, but the result is only to show why legal and constitutional history,
potentially a fascinating and intellectually satisfying branch of study, fre-
quently possesses a desert-like aridity. The categorization of subject matter
though breaking down still survives, and many consider it out of place in
legal history to concern themselves with the broader aspects of social evo-
lution; even though law without society is Macbetlt with only the ghost.
The neglect of legal materials has been more characteristic of modern
than of medieval historiography. The medievalists have always gone to the
legal "smithy" and have discovered not only the constitutional history of the
middle ages but also the social and economic and, to a lesser extent, the
intellectual and cultural history. The court records have revealed both the
anatomy and the physiology of feudalism; the Close Rolls have illuminated
social questions; and these and similar sources provide the surest insight
into medieval political theory. Judgment concerning what is called the out-
look of the times is meaningless without legal evidence. Or, to take another
type of instance: a thorough analysis of the law of real property could enable
the historian to visualize much of the civilization of the middle ages (and
of modern times as well). It has been observed (but never tested) that
an adequate knowledge of that law would equip the scholar interested in
social and economic history most effectively. If to this were added such
assets as the law of inheritance and of contracts, such a scholar would have
a magnificent foundation on which to base his generalizations.
Legal materials, it is obvious, make the historian more historically
minded, less ready to leap ahead of his evidence, and more cautious about
the "intrusion of untimely ideas." They reveal the danger of carrying words
and concepts applicable to modem society over to earlier and more homo-
geneous societies; they reveal also that although "primitive" man supple-
mented law with magic, "civilized" man follows much the same procedure
[Vol. 9
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in elevating certain institutions to a sacrosanct status and in making in-
cantations to transcendental concepts. Not infrequently, furthermore, the
historian is faced with the problem of reconstructing a past the ideals of
which seem irrelevant or even superficial, the catchwords barren, the con-
troversies unimportant, and the loyalties ridiculous; and he finds it very
difficult not to be a little scornful. But law indicates greater continuity than
often appears in other historical sources, for it tends to reduce the impres-
sion of a cataclysmic break with the past and to reveal the pervasive power
of old ideas and institutions.
For example, the English Restoration (1660), regardless of whether
authors believe it to be or not, is usually portrayed as the end of one epoch
and the beginning of another. While such a picture may be true in respect
to religion the social and economic life of England did not greatly change.
And if one were to consult only litigious sources he might indeed have trou-
ble discovering that any consequential change had taken place in 1660.
While this of course would be going too far away from the facts, because
examination of other historical materials indicates a considerable emotional
and political transformation, it does show how easily superficial changes such
as the restoration of the "legitimate" ruler can be taken to describe a revolu-
tion whereas in many ways the deep waters of English civilization ran on
as quietly as if nothing had happened. On the other hand, it should not
be assumed that nothing changed; breaks with the past do occur and law
changes with society.
Here legal sources are important in offsetting the assumption made by
some so-called historians that what survives is alone important and worthy
of recording, and who therefore are prepared to disregard institutions and
concepts simply because they seem no longer to exist. Greater dependence
on law would reveal the unhistorical sterility of such a standpoint, by illus-
trating that what existed under certain laws, but now no longer surviving,
had a tremendous significance in the earlier days and upon what has since
come into being. Law likewise tends to reduce that untimely failing of his-
torians known as predicting the past, by bringing a sense of evidence and the
means of testing that evidence. It introduces into investigations a rigorous
element that halts the practice of basing broader and broader generalizations
on slimmer and slimmer evidence, and of finding master clues in the preoccu-
pations of modern writers. Law describes not only what theoretically is but
also what actually was, or, as Gierke put it, law is the result of a common
conviction not that a thing shall be but that it is. If the statutes are not to be
1944]
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taken as all-conclusive in this particular, the evidence of untold court records,
local and central, ecclesiastical and civil, equity and common, supplies a
reservoir of proof that cannot be disregarded.
The use of legal materials and their integration with other sources has
also greatly enhanced the value of non-legal studies and has supplied a
basis for criticizing rather facile generalizations. To see what can be done
by the use of legal sources in the way of producing a brilliant and incisive
analysis of socio-economic conditions one need go no farther than R. H.
Tawney's The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteentk Century. Mr. Tawney
could never have moved so easily amid the complications of that period
nor could he have thrown so much light upon the problem had he not been
thoroughly acquainted with the legal sources. More learned and more
factual monographs have been written but one will seek long to find a study
so suggestive both in content and method. More prosaic but in its way a
valuable study illustrative of the same point is a recent volume in the
Cambridge Studies in Economic History, a series of which any volume so
far published might be mentioned as evidence.' 3 In this particular work
the author uses local court records to discover the incidence and the treat-
ment of poverty in Cambridgeshire. In so doing she follows the path of some
earlier students, notably Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who have found in
legal sources the clue to much English social history, modern as well as
medieval. Crime, poor relief, education, immorality, public health, as well
as the details of administration, are only some of the problems illuminated
by the wealth of these sources which in addition possess a concrete reality
that other sorts of materials sometimes fail to provide.
14
In a different fashion one should remember that it is on the side of
law and the whole fabric of which law is the framework that the perma-
nence of British imperialism is most pronounced and unique. Centuries ago
-- though they knew it not-English lawyers and legislators were penning
writs, creating political, social, and legal institutions, even making right
and wrong for primitive and darkest Africa, for the then purely legendary
13. E. M. HAMPSON, THE TREATMENT OF POVERTY IN CAMBRIDGESHIRE, 1597-
1834 (1934). See also in the same series, FRANCES M. PAGE, THE ESTATES OF CRow-
LAND ABBEY: A STUDY IN MANORIAL ORGANIZATION (1934).
14. One of the best illustrations of this is to be seen in the records of courts
leet. The orders against violation of the Sabbath, trespass, roving animals, short
weight, overloading the common, tippling at unlawful hours, stopped-up ditches,
breaches of the peace, and harboring vagabonds carry us readily, even vividly, into
the country village of three centuries past. The rules for towns such as Southamp-
[Vol. 9
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Antipodes, for the undiscovered North American continent, and for an
India whose civilization was already ancient while theirs was in its infancy.
Only once has this process been equaled and then by a similar expression-
the spread of Roman law throughout Europe. The overwhelming majesty
of such achievement refutes utterly the notion of law as a mere conven-
tion, a tricky body of mysteries evolved by a profession to cheat the lay-
man, and establishes it as the physi9logy of our whole social organism.
Whether we think of contracts, injuries or justice, of procedure or substance,
we and tens of millions of others think in terms that Englishmen have form-
ulated during many centuries. Upon such foundations societies of all grades
of political and social maturity have built their varied non-legal institu-
tions and enshrined their varied ideals.
The permeation of English law was largely effected by judges and ad-
ministrators, either by supplementing customary law, by grafting it on local
custom, or by replacing such haphazard legal devices as already existed.
In many countries over which England extended her jurisdiction formal
native law was at once scanty and particularistic and yet complex. English
law supplied a uniformity, a simplicity, and a universality that had been
lacking so that in a modified form it became the law of the land and thus
the doorway to other English institutions. The impact of a completed yet
not static body of law upon unsystematic, ill-defined, even though indigen-
ous, stubborn, and complex custom has, for example, created the situation
where Indian treatises on Property, Torts, Insolvency, Monopoly, and
Transportation-to list no others-draw heavily upon English cases going
back in some instances for several centuries. 5 The political independence
of India, when it comes, will not be so complete as the most rabid Anglo-
ton and Manchester with their concern over pavements, water supply, and refuse
disposal reveal a growing urban consciousness in the seventeenth century. The
silences of these records are not less important than their contents; and the insight
into the machinery of local government is as fascinating as the objectives of that
government. For some clues to this whole field, see F.J.C. HEARNSHAW, LEEr JURIS-
DICTION IN ENGLAND ESPECIALLY AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RECORDS OF THE COURT
LEEr OF SOUTHAMPTON (1908); F. W. MAITLAND, SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND
OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS (1889); WILLIAM HUDSON, LEET JURISDICTION IN THE
CITY OF NoRwICH (1892); SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT: THE MANOR AND BOROUGH (1924); MARY D. HARRIS, THE COVENTRY LEET
BOOK: OR MAYOR'S REGISTER (1907-13); and JOHN HARLAND, COURT LEET RECORDS
OF THE MANOR OF MANCHESTER (1864-65). One of the most valuable sources in this
field is an unworked collection of records for the manor of Ashby de la Zouche,
running from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, preserved in the Huntington
Library; I hope to do something with these in the near future.
15. SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW (1938) 1-5.
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phobe might desire. English law has made a great many people brothers
under the robe.
The value of legal sources in testing facile generalizations is sharply
revealed by an analysis of the Turner frontier hypothesis. In turning the
dry light of law upon that hypothesis (and here is meant not only the justly
famous thesis of Turner himself but also the extension, none too critically
made by disciples who in some cases have unwittingly been guilty of
reductio ad absurdam) Wright has ably shown that, though much of the
peculiar character of American civilization has derived from frontier influ-
ence, the frontier got much more from the East than it gave.10 By a rigorous
examination of frontier legal practice and institutions he has pointed out
that what are sometimes regarded as the unique qualities of the frontier
were actually legacies from the East. Without destroying the validity of
the general hypothesis he has rendered impossible its blind acceptance as
the master clue to American historical development. He has demonstrated
again that if a lawyer should know history the historian should know law.
In addition to historians who have used law in a supplementary manner
one cannot neglect two diverse historians of law itself, Maitland and Holds-
worth, who reveal so much more than technical detail in their works. To
read Maitland is of course to appreciate how correct was Acton's appraisal
of him as the ablest of English historians and how far wrong was Samuel
Johnson's remark that great abilities were not requisite for an historian who,
having his facts ready to hand, required no more imagination than a medi-
ocre poet, and needed only a little penetration, accuracy, coloring, and appli-
cation. And to read Maitland is also to appreciate what insight into the
past can be gained by coupling immense legal knowledge with an acute
imagination and with genuine historical perspective.
Maitland used legal materials to relate the intricacies of local govern-
ment, the fascinating problems of Church and State, the complex and far-
reaching significance of economic history, and the intellectually stimulating
vistas of political philosophy, as well as the constitutional history of Eng-
land. Moreover, he understood so well the materials which he used. For
him history was a seamless web in which every beginning was arbitrary and
every ending a temporary halt; especially was this true of legal history.
16. B. F. WRIGHT, Political Institutions and the Frontier (D. R. Fox ed. 1934)
SOURCES OF CULTURE -IN THE MIDDLE WEST. The doctoral dissertation of W. Francis
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"The history of law must be the history of ideas. It must represent, not
merely what men have done and said, but what men have thought in by-
gone ages."'1 In his inaugural lecture on the occasion of his appointment
to the Downing Chair of the Laws of England in 1888 he remarked that
the history of forms of action ". . ought to be a most interesting book, deal-
ing as it would have to deal with the evolution of the great elementary con-
ceptions, ownership, possession, contract, tort and the like."', He likewise
stressed the significance of crime, "even vulgar crime," for "crime is a fact
of which history must take note." English law then to him was English
history, and no matter whether he was considering procedure or substance,
public or private law, he comprehended its relation to the whole national
life. For him law was no static mold but rather the foundation of a most
dynamic grasp of England's historical development.
In this same inaugural lecture he also epitomized the nature and worth
of legal sources.' 9
"Legal documents, documents of the most technical kind, are the
best, often the only evidence that we have for social and economic
history, for the history of morality, for the history of practical
religion. Take a broad subject-the condition of the great mass of
Englishmen in the later middle ages, the condition of the villagers.
That might be pictured for us in all truthful detail; its political,
social, economic, moral aspects might all be brought out; every ten-
dency of progress or degradation might be traced; our supply of
evidence is inexhaustible: but no one will extract its meaning who
has not the patience to master an extremely formal system of plead-
ing and procedure, who is not familiar with a whole scheme of
actions with repulsive names. There are large and fertile tracts of
history which the historian as a rule has to avoid because they are
too legal."
17. DooMsDAY BOOK AND BEYOND (1897) 356.
18. Why the History of English Law is not written, 1 COLLECTED PAPERS
(1911) 484. Later on he did give a course of seven masterly lectures, The Forms of
Action at Common Law (1909), in which he denied that obsolete procedure was an
unprofitable study and insisted with Sir Henry Maine that, "Substantive law is
secreted in the interstices of procedure." Forms of action, he went on to say,
we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves." Those many forms,
each with its uncouth name," expressed ". . . a choice between methods
of procedure," a question of ". . . very great practical importance," for "Knowledge
of the procedure in the various forms of action is the core of English medieval juris-
prudence."
19. 1 Collected Papers, supra at 486.
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The same viewpoint permeated the essay on "The Materials for Eng-
lish Legal History."20 Here he observed that the history of history seemed
to show that only late in the day had the laws of a nation become in the
historian's eyes a matter demanding thorough treatment; and he regretted
that, while no one would deny the "abstract proposition that law is, to say
the least, a considerable element in national life," in the past historians had
been apt to regard it as an element which remained constant. Historians
had found "the history of external events, of wars and alliances, conquests
and annexations, the lives of kings and great men, easier to write," and for
appearances only they threw in a few lightly written paragraphs on "the
manners and customs of the period," but these must not be very long or
very serious. Only gradually did historians desire to know "the men of
past times more thoroughly, to know their works and their ways, to know
not merely the,distinguished men, but the undistinguished also."
History by trying to reproduce the political atmosphere in which great
men lived and acted became "constitutional;" but it could not really stop
there: already it had entered the realm of law, to find that realm an organ-
ized whole, one that could not be cut up into departments. "The public
law that the historian wants as stage and scenery for his characters is found
to imply private law, and private law a sufficient knowledge of which can-
not be taken for granted." In answering, likewise, the demand for social
and economic history, it was soon discovered that only in legal documents
and under legal forms were the social and economic arrangements of remote
times made visible. The history of law thus appeared to Maitland both
as a means to an end and at the same time as an end in itself, "the history
of one great stream of human endeavor, of a stream which can be traced
through centuries, whose flow can be watched decade by decade and even
year by year." Admitting that the importance of law might be exaggerated
he declared that even if law was no more than the skeleton of the body
politic, students of the body natural could not afford to be scornful of bones,
nor even of dry bones: "they must know their anatomy."
Before leaving Maitland mention may be made of his observation that
two great English historians, Froude and Freeman, who could agree about
nothing else had agreed that English history must be read in the Statute
Book. In the course of time, he went on, "...the amendment will be adopted
20. 2 id. at 2-3.
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that to the Statute Book be added the Law Reports, the Court Rolls and
some other little matters."
Holdsworth also has variously demonstrated the value of law to the
historian both by practice and by precept. His monumental History of
Englisk Law, despite its deficiencies, is the most substantial contribution to
the history of English civilization in print; it plots the course of Maitland's
Cone great stream of human endeavour," and even more: it describes the
evolution of a nation. Some writers, less learned and therefore less cautious,
have been more philosophical or perhaps more stimulating, but none have
supplied a more solid body of facts from which insight could be gained.
At a time when monographs comprise our historiography we may pay tribute
to a man who has tried to see the whole. In all probability no one but a
legal historian could in these days set down the history of a civilization on
the scale which Holdsworth has laid out. In addition he has stated a few
explicit observations on the value of law to the historian. 21 Not so brilliant
here as Maitland his words lead to a similar conclusion.
It can readily be argued then that the law broadly construed is a lib-
eral education and viewed historically is among the richest of sources. The
aid which enabled Maitland to reconstruct so many aspects of English his-
tory and Holdsworth to view a long chain of English development can be
used by any historian for any period or any country where the materials
exist; and no materials are more likely to exist in abundance. Diaries, cor-
respondence, tracts, account books may survive only in limited areas, but
legal records flourish virtually everywhere, and no historical student whose
field of interest lies in his own country or even in certain institutional or
intellectual developments can plead a lack of materials. If all local records
are not as rich as those of England all can be used to uncover the evolution
of a particular locality. The court records of any county may throw as
much light on the essential features of American civilization, and they
certainly demand as much penetration and application, as the 'contents of
the largest repository in the land.
The value of law to the historian, as already pointed out, is most ap-
parent in ideas, institutions, and policies, and in supplementing other mate-
rials and supplying a basis for substantiation or criticism. Formal, reports
may often be found inadequate or even superficial; pamphlets or newspapers
21. SOME LESSONS FROM OUR LEGAL HISTORY (1928) passim.
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are generally the pleas of interested persons or groups; and private papers
may possess only a limited appeal or value. Although legal documents are
by no means free of these same characteristics, on the whole they supply their
own means of verification.
The deficiencies of other materials, and the corresponding value of legal
sources, come to light in estimating the position of the English protestant dis-
senters in the period between 1660 and 1828. On the basis of statutes, tracts,
and private papers one would be justified in claiming, as historians often
have, that the dissenters suffered hardships without relief during that period.
To a certain extent such a conclusion is well founded, yet it by no means tells
the full story. It does not reveal to what degree the dissenters did suffer in
many particular ways; neither does it reveal to what extent they secured
relief from the courts before the legislation against them was repealed. One
must have recourse to court records to discover for example how dissenters
suffered in matters of legacies, evidence, trusteeships, and penalties for not
serving as corporation officers. Likewise one may discover in the court
records how judges like Mansfield and Foster provided relief against handi-
caps permitted under general statutes. For a century after the passage of
the Corporation Act (1661) dissenters were liable to suffer the hardship
and injustice of dual punishment for the same offence. Then such a prac-
tice came to an end. To find the explanation for the change one must go to
the case of Evans v. Harrison.22 There and only there, so far as the writer
knows, is the key to the puzzle. Such a state of affairs no doubt might be
repeated many times.
In the realm of ideas law contributes to the broader aspects of political,
economic, and social theory. Furthermore it throws light on religious con-
cepts. In the words of Maitland "the ideas of law are at bottom economic
and even moral ideas applied to daily life." In the field of political theory
law deserves quite as much attention as the political "classics," for though
it may be true that the political theory of yesterday is the constitutional
law of today, that same constitutional law is also the political theory of
tomorrow. Law shows pretty clearly the rise of "statism" and the emer-
22. WILMOT, 130-62; 2 BURNS, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW (8th ed.) 207-20. For a
full discussion of this matter see the present writer's article, 21 VA. L. REv. (1935)
641-64. I have treated the whole problem of the dissenters' legal position, with
special reference to relief through the courts, in 22 VA. L. REv. (1936) 495; 23 VA.
L. REV. (1937) 389; 25 VA. L. REV. (1939) 671. The condition of the Catholics is
set forth in 9 FORDHAM L. REV. (1940) 38-64.
(Vol. 9
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gence of collectivism and must be considered not only in connection with such
formal though slippery concepts as "sovereignty" and "rights" but also in
relation to the whole fabric of political society and the obscure springs of
political action. Moreover, in ideas as in policies and in institutions, law
instructs scarcely less by what it omits and neglects than by what it regu-
lates. So far as method in political theory is concerned the lawyers con-
tributed the historical and to a certain extent the comparative approach.
Readers of Sir Henry Maine will appreciate the degree to which a lawyer
can illuminate political ideas by his method not less than by the arsenal
of his facts.
Social and economic theory also stands revealed by law. Some students
of law and legislation interpret their history idealistically as exhibiting
greater social justice while others see it as proving the existence of class
interests. The purpose here is neither idealistic nor marxian but illustrative.
It can be taken as axiomatic, however, that the notion that the law knows
no difference between men is a myth, for both in their inception and in their
application the prevailing legal doctrines and practices are those of the
ruling classes. It is not merely that a utilities plunderer gets acquittal (and
perhaps an LL.D.) and that a bread-stealer get five years and perpetual
stigma; it is rather that as always the very nature of the crime is defined
by the people in power.
As we pass from ideas to policies and institutions the significance of
law is more clear though not more impressive. According to Vinogradoff
"legal arrangements are a variety of social organization." 23 Although it is
probably true, however, that law is the product of society, whether idealis-
tically, economically, or ethnologically construed, it is also true that to no
small degree society is the product of its laws. Mansfield supplies the evi-
dence that English law in the eighteenth century adjusted itself to the needs
and ends of a business civilization. In breaking down the barriers of the
common law and building up a "system of commercial law of great beauty
and equity," he became, in the words of Story, ". . . the jurist of the commer-
cial world" and the architect of a most "salutary revolution." 2 4 By heeding
the facts of economic life when he built up the law merchant Mansfield was
23. COMMON-SENSE IN LAW (New York, n. d.) 14.
24. MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS (1835) 262; see 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPTI
STORY (1851) 14. For other aspects of Mansfield's opinions see the present writer's
article, Lord Mansfield and the English, Dissenters, 2 Mo. L. REv. (1937) 46.
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as important for future economic development as his contemporaries, Adam
Smith and James Watt.
Similarly, although the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics, a great many people and especially those in influen-
tial positions have thought that it did, and social organization has been
affected accordingly. The philosophy of Spencer and the ideas of those who
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment did enact his philosophy had more
than an accidental coincidence: Spencer and Mr. Justice McReynolds be-
long to the same tradition. If legislation is frequently the end product of a
national crisis and as such relates much of the emotion and details of that
crisis, it at the same time regulates future development. For example, the
banking laws of nineteenth century England represent an effort to adapt
British monetary machinery to new conditions yet in a way they sentenced
England to a financial strait-jacket from which, however, the country was
periodically relieved by the litigation necessitated by the deficiencies of the
legislation, litigation which amplified, extended, applied, and modified -the
general statements. Both the laws and the lawsuits, furthermore, reveal
who was in power and what were the prevailing theories and practices of
the time.
Dicey's Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in
England during the Nineteenth Century and Pipkin's The Idea of Social
Justice, a Study of Legislation and Administration and the Labour Move-
ment in England and France between 1900 and 1926 testify also to the same
effect. In addition to the implicit evidence of his brilliant study Dicey ex-
plicitly emphasizes the place of law in society. Realizing that the ultimate
sanction of law is effective social functioning he appreciates that law may
result not only from public opinion but also from custom or from organized
minority demands; he also appreciates that law may create opinion and that
in some instances opinion does not produce legislation. In support of this
last point he maintains that English law was not affected by the advance
of democracy per se. The growth of collectivist legislation in the nineteenth
century took place not because of the growth of political democracy but be-
cause a wide gap existed between social and legal conditions and because
Jeremy Bentham had left a large legacy of optimism concerning the potency
of legislation.
Pipkin's book presents some interesting contrasts to that of Dicey be-
cause it illustrates how an entirely different approach to the same sort of
materials can produce different answers. Dicey looked upon the growth of
(Vol. 9
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collectivism as an interesting phenomenon, important but a phenomenon to
be viewed objectively. The proverbial legist, he refused to excite himself
about a tendency that only illustrated as did many others the pervasive
character of legal institutions. Pipkin by contrast limited his attention much
more to the externals of legal tendencies and was frankly subjective and
"progressive." He considered legislation almost entirely from the view-
point of the "communal good" it sought to establish; and he identified "com-
munal good" with social control. Yet admitting this social philosophy he
has pointed up some of the major tendencies of our time. If his book must
be checked against other studies and if it could well have depended more on
litigious sources this is not to deny the value of the investigations so far
as they go; and it is doubtful if any other body of sources would have told
so much. Certainly no other materials would provide of themselves such
adequate means of checking the inferences drawn from them.
An illustration from the history of the United States is unsurpassed
for pertinence here. Joseph Story in 1842 handed down a decision, Swift v.
Tyson, which had the effect of conferring on the Federal Courts "control
over commercial transactions in diversity of citizenship cases" and thus
greatly widened the scope of federal jurisdiction. In his tendency to exalt
the power of the national government in the protection of commerce and to
invoke the aid of the common law for that purpose Story was building up
the American equivalent of Mansfield's system of commercial law. Under
the leadership of such men as Story, whose views were expressed on the
bench and in a Harvard classroom, Marshall, and Webster, nationalist views
of laws were identified with constructive statesmanship, the opposite views
with ruin and disunion, and "faith in commerce as the basis of a stable
nation" was established. 25 The law then in such hands had the diverse
effects of offsetting the practice of state legislatures to favor the debtor
class, of increasing the confidence of business classes, and, while encourag-
ing some tendencies to secession, of reducing other such tendencies, espe-
cially in New England where the commercial classes were the strongest.
History thus illustrates the dynamic and denies the static interpreta-
tion of law, but in grasping this fact it is necessary to admit both legisla-
tion and litigation. The two supplement one another. Where the statute
25. Waterman, The Nationalism of Swift v. Tyson, 11 N. C. L. REv. (1933)
125; see C. G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930) 196; MAX
LERNER, John Marshall's Long Shadow (1935) THE NEW REPUBLIC (1935) 148.
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seems to place arbitrary limits, the lawsuit permits special interpretation.
Where the decision is palpably unjust, the statute may provide a new general
definition to relieve the wrong. Dicey once declared that the views of judges
were apt to correspond to the opinions of the day before yesterday; yet it
is nonetheless incumbent upon the historian, as Maitland remarked, to
"study the day before yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyse
today, and today may not paralyse tomorrow." Moreover, on the whole,
it appears that if one is seeking evidence of progress he is more likely to
find it in the records of courts than in the statute books. Such matters as
religious dissent, witchcraft, and various phases of public health received
enlightened treatment by judges long before the legislature moved abreast
of informed public opinion. Yet it is safer not to generalize extensively in
this matter, for consistent enlightenment is not the attribute of any man
or group. Lord Mansfield's judgments concerning slavery, religious dissent,
and the law merchant establish him as a beacon of progress, but his atti-
tude towards the American colonies place him in the front row of reaction-
aries.
But these are problems by the way. Whether liberal or conservative,
law is the "framework of the social machine," and it is the especial glory
of English law "that its roots are sunk deep into the soil of national his-
tory." While we learn most from substantive law we must not dismiss pro-
cedure. Private law has value not less than public law; indeed it may offer
more, for where the latter is largely occupied with political and adminis-
trative questions the former deals extensively with social and economic con-
cerns. The legislation and the state trials of the seventeenth century throw
much light on many important English issues but in order to discover the
more obscure but not less important features of the rise of economic individ-
ualism it is necessary to go to the records of private law. In this connec-
tion Mr. Justice Holmes has made a characteristically pertinent observa-
tion. "My keenest interest is excited," he confessed, "not by what are called
great questions and great cases, but by little decisions which the common
run of selectors would pass by because they did not deal with the constitu-
tion, or a telephone company, yet which have in them the germ of some
wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitial change in the very
tissue of the law."26
26. COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.
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Although the writer's examples have been chosen from English and
American history because of greater familiarity with the subject, instances
abound in the history of other countries. In the rising tide of German
nationalism in the nineteenth century no element was more important than
law. The nationalist school of lawyers gave substantial meaning and foun-
dation to vaguely patriotic hopes and claims. One could well consider also
the extent to which French influence during the same century was grounded
in the Code Napoleon, an influence that enabled various European coun-
tries and others to undergo a French Revolution without a reign of terror.
If one is considering the history of tendencies that cut across national
boundaries he can scarcely omit reference to laws. To take a particular
instance: in any narrative of the humanitarian movement in the nineteenth
century a large part of the evidence comes from this source. When students
seek support for their contention that earlier ages were callous they point
to the innumerable brutalities in the legal system, and conversely when
they seek to prove a changing viewpoint they stress the repeal of those
laws. The growth of what we call political and social democracy is mean-
ingless without attention to legislation and court decisions, either as they
endow the hitherto unprivileged classes with new strength or as they sub-
tract from the older privileged groups the favors which set them apart.
Even in the more remote realm of science (and I omit all questions of
patents and inventions) it is possible to gain some insight from law. During
the English plague scare of 1720 parliamentary enactments showed that
prevention rather than cure was the ideal and that instead of depending
on magical incantations or even on the cures of leading physicians, the gov-
ernment adopted a policy not far different from that which has been followed
under similar circumstances in the recent past. Certainly the concept of
past medicine as superstition and of no public regulation receives a decisive
setback from the examination of legal sources.
In conclusion then it may be said that if law only contributed to our
firmer grasp of institutional history its worth would be established; but
when its value extends to the better understanding of tendencies and ideas
we may justly believe that few sources possess such pertinence for the his-
20
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torian.27 And when to this pertinence is added a large degree of depend-
ability, a width that is not shallow and a depth that is not narrow, Mr.
Justice Holmes's enthusiasm for his "eternally weaving princess" inspires
no dissent.28
27. I might add that several pertinent explorations of the relation between
law and literature have been most informing; for example, SIR PLUNKET BARTON,
SHAKESPEARE AND THE LAW (1929), F. CARL RIEDEL, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
THE OLD FRENCH ROMANCES (1938), and HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A
LEGAL HISTORIAN (1929). Moreover, the plays of W. S. Gilbert are redolent with
legal quips, and in Iolanthe he brilliantly 1poses a dilemma in procedure: "The feel-
ings of a Lord Chancellor who is in love with a ward of court are not to be envied.
What is his position? Can he give his own consent to his own marriage with his
own ward? Can he marry his own ward without his own consent? And if he marries
his own ward without his own consent, can he commit himself for contempt of his
own court? Can he appeal by counsel before himself to move for arrest of his own
judgment? Ah, my lords, it is indeed painful to have to sit upon a woolsack which
is stuffed with such thorns as these."
28. It should not be overlooked of course that the princess nods at her weaving
now and then. We cannot invariably agree that
"Tle law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent:
It has no kind of fault or flaw;
And I, my Lords, embody the law."
With Bumble we must concur that if the law supposes that when a wife commits
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